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Abstract 
It has been suggested that the evidence used to support a decision to move our 
eyes and the confidence we have in that decision are derived from a common 
source. Alternatively, confidence may be based on further post-decisional processes. 
In three experiments we examined this. In Experiment 1, participants chose between 
two targets on the basis of varying levels of evidence (i.e., the direction of motion 
coherence in a Random-Dot-Kinematogram). They indicated this choice by making a 
saccade to one of two targets and then indicated their confidence. Saccade 
trajectory deviation was taken as a measure of the inhibition of the non-selected 
target. We found that as evidence increased so did confidence and deviations of 
saccade trajectory away from the non-selected target. However, a correlational 
analysis suggested they were not related. In Experiment 2 an option to opt-out of the 
choice was offered on some trials if choice proved too difficult. In this way we 
isolated trials on which confidence in target selection was high (i.e., when the option 
to opt-out was available but not taken). Again saccade trajectory deviations were 
found not to differ in relation to confidence. In Experiment 3 we directly manipulated 
confidence, such that participants had high or low task confidence. They showed no 
differences in saccade trajectory deviations. These results support post-decisional 
accounts of confidence: evidence supporting the decision to move the eyes is 
reflected in saccade control, but the confidence that we have in that choice is subject 
to further post-decisional processes. 
Keywords:      Saccades           Decision Making         Confidence  
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Introduction 
In our daily lives, we are continually making decisions about where to look next. 
These on-going perceptual decisions result in eye movements that occur 3-4 times a 
second. This decision-making process is often viewed as a competition between 
potential target objects in the visual scene to become the location for the next 
saccade (Findlay and Walker 1999). In order to make a saccade to a chosen target, 
other stimuli need to be inhibited by the saccadic system. This is reflected in 
changes in the control of the eye movement. Changes are seen in the dynamics and 
metrics of the eye such as the latency of response (reaction time), the trajectory (its 
path of travel) and the landing position, and have been interpreted as indicative of 
the underlying competitive process which culminate in a perceptual decision 
(McSorley et al. 2009; McSorley and McCloy 2009; McSorley et al. 2012; Meeter et 
al. 2010; Tipper et al. 2001;  Van der Stigchel et al. 2006). However the majority of 
experiments examining saccadic eye movement control in target selection have 
largely removed the element of target choice as the target identity is known prior to 
the experiment. Hence the decision becomes not about target choice so much as 
target localization. Thus they do not show whether the processes involved in making 
the decision underlying target choice influence saccade control.   
 
Taking the lead from a large body of work examining the neural activity involved in 
perceptual decision making, specifically in situations of eye movement target choice 
in which target identity is supported by different levels of evidence (Britten et al. 
1996; Gold and Shadlen 2001; Gold and Shadlen 2000; Horwitz and Newsome 
2001; Kim and Shadlen 1999; Roitman and Shadlen 2002; Shadlen and Newsome 
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2001), McSorley and McCloy (2009) carried out an experiment in order to examine 
how, or if, the decision making element of saccade choice is reflected in the 
dynamics and metrics of the eye movement. They varied the amount of evidence 
(the motion direction indicated by different levels of motion coherence in a random 
dot kinematogram – RDK) indicating the saccade target and found that the average 
saccade latency decreased with increasing evidence, whereas the number of correct 
responses increased. Importantly they also found that the trajectories and landing 
positions of correct saccades deviated away from the non-selected target, and on 
both measures this deviation increased with higher levels of supporting evidence. 
This suggests that the level of evidence is directly reflected in the programming of 
the saccade. McSorley and McCloy suggest that there is a quicker development of 
inhibition for higher levels of evidence, leading to an increased deviation away from 
the inhibited non-selected target. This was taken to reflect underlying neural activity 
associated with accumulation of evidence and the competition between targets. 
These results suggest that saccade deviations and landing positions can represent 
the activation state of neurons involved in the decision making process.  
 
Accompanying decisions is a sense of confidence (Yeung and Summerfield 2012), 
and it is generally assumed that people form beliefs about the likelihood that they will 
get the decision right (Harvey 1997). There have been suggestions (Audley 1964; 
Link 1992; Petrusic and Baranski 2003; Vickers 1979) that the same mechanisms 
that underlie the decision making process also underlie confidence judgements. 
There is a class of models that assumes that confidence is based on the quality and 
quantity of the evidence available for a choice (decisional locus models). The quality 
of evidence is represented by how quickly evidence is accumulated in favour of one 
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alternative, and the quantity is represented by a bound that the accumulation needs 
to reach in order for a decision to be made. Decisional locus models state that 
confidence in the decision can be read out directly from the accumulated evidence 
that supports the choice at the time the decision was made (e.g., Kepecs et al. 2008; 
Kiani and Shadlen 2009). In support of this, Kiani and Shadlen (2009) have recently 
shown that choice confidence using an RDK task can be related to the variable 
discharge of LIP neurons, such that intermediate levels of discharge (where levels of 
activation associated with one choice was not appreciably greater than that 
supporting the other) were found on trials in which non-human primates elected to 
opt-out of saccade target choice to take a small but certain reward. This suggests 
that degree of certainty in the choice made and not just the choice itself could be 
reflected in the competitive processes which underlie the control of the saccadic eye 
movements: i.e., deviations in the metrics and dynamics of the saccade may not just 
reflect the choice but also the confidence in that choice.  
 
However, there is conflicting evidence that suggests that a sense of confidence is 
not purely based on the same information that led to the choice itself, but rather 
results from additional post-decisional processing (Juslin and Olsson 1997; Vickers 
1979; Yeung and Summerfield 2012). For example, Pleskac and Busemeyer (2010) 
present a model that accounts for distributions of choice, reaction times and 
confidence ratings in a two-stage model. The first stage consists of sequential 
sampling of evidence in a random walk process (Laming 1968; Link and Heath 1975; 
Ratcliff 1978; Stone 1960) that gradually drifts in favour of one alternative over the 
other, and eventually reaches a pre-set level at which a choice is made. Both choice 
and decision times are a compromise between the quality and the quantity of the 
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evidence. In a second-stage, confidence ratings are made on the basis of post-
decisional processing. This is conceived as being a continuation of evidence 
accumulation that took place in the first “decision” stage. For example, this might 
take the form of a fixed temporal window over which further evidence accumulation 
takes place. The state of the evidence supporting either choice at this point forms the 
basis of the confidence rating (e.g., Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010). The authors do 
not postulate how the evidence is gathered, allowing that it could be a measure of 
the match between a test item and a memory (Ratcliff 1978) or even the difference in 
activation between two pools of neurons (Gold and Shadlen 2002; Gold and Shadlen 
2001).  
 
In this paper, we aim to examine whether confidence in a choice is derived from the 
same neural firing rates as those responsible for eye movement control when 
executing a perceptual choice or whether confidence and eye movement control 
maybe based on the same source but are ultimately separable in some sense (e.g., 
through post-decisional processing). To this end a series of three experiments were 
carried out in which observers were asked to make a motion discrimination decision 
on the basis of varying amounts of supporting evidence in an RDK. In the first, as 
well as making a saccade to a target on the basis of the motion inherent in the 
motion coherence stimuli, participants were also required to make a confidence 
judgement. If confidence in a choice were derived from the same neural firing rates 
as those responsible for eye movement control then different amounts of supporting 
evidence would be expected to have a similar effect on choice confidence as they do 
on saccade metrics and dynamics. In the second, we introduced an opt-out visual 
target that could be selected if the participants were unsure of the motion direction. 
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Following Kiani & Shadlen (2009), we reasoned that correctly directed saccades 
made on trials in which an opt-out target was available but was not selected would 
be associated with greater confidence. We would therefore expect to see greater 
trajectory deviation on those trials relative to those in which no opt-out target was 
presented. In the third, we directly examined whether confidence could impact on 
saccade control by manipulating participants’ confidence independent of actual 
performance. If it is the case that confidence judgement and saccade control are 
derived from the same underlying activity then it should be the case that different 
levels of pre-existing confidence may change this underlying activity. Thus being 
more confident in target choice more generally may reduce saccade latencies and 
increase trajectory deviations away from the non-selected target by increasing the 
extent of inhibition of the target or the speed by which that inhibition develops. In 
order to examine the impact of confidence on saccade deviation in target choice, we 
provided manipulated feedback to two groups of participants regarding their 
performance on the same RDK task as in Experiment 1. This instilled differing levels 
of confidence between the two groups independently of the external evidence. In a 
subsequent block of trials, with unmodified feedback appropriate to their choices, we 
examined whether the differences in confidence felt by the two groups impacted on 
the same underlying activity from which saccade trajectory control is derived or 
whether saccade trajectory reflected the evidence supporting target selection to the 
same extent regardless of confidence.  
 
To pre-empt our findings somewhat, we find that choice performance and the 
associated confidence increased as the evidence supporting the choice increased, 
but there was little to no relationship between confidence in the choice and the eye 
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movement deviations. This suggests that while both eye movement deviations and 
confidence reflect the perceptual evidence supporting the choice they are to some 
extent independent of each other.  
 
Experiment 1 
 
In this first experiment, the motion coherence of an RDK was manipulated in order to 
provide differing levels of evidence to support target choice. As well as making a 
saccade to a target based on the motion of the dots, participants were also required 
to make a confidence judgement. We aimed to establish whether the level of 
evidence had the same impact on the saccade metrics and the reported confidence. 
McSorley and McCloy (2009) have shown that the evidence supporting a choice 
impacts on the saccade metrics, causing a deviation of the movement away from the 
non-selected target. The authors attribute this to the increased evidence for one 
target over another resulting in the activation for the non-selected target being 
inhibited more quickly. This area of inhibition then impacts on the trajectory and 
landing position of the saccade, leading to a deviation away from the non-selected 
target.  In line with this we would expect to see confidence in target selection also 
increase with evidence supporting a choice. If these are derived from common 
mechanisms then the amount of evidence present in the RDK should be expected to 
similarly affect both the saccade metrics and the reported confidence in the decision.  
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Method 
Observers 
20 observers participated in the experiment, 19 of which were naïve undergraduates, 
and one experimenter (CL). Participants were aged between 18 and 25 years old. All 
had normal, or corrected to normal eyesight.  Local ethical approval was obtained, 
and the study was conducted in accordance with the standards described in the 
1964 Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
Apparatus 
Participants’ eye movements (left eye only) were recorded using an Eyelink II, which 
is a head mounted eye tracker with a 500 Hz sampling rate. Participants placed their 
chin on a rest, which constrained any head movements and ensured the viewing 
distance remained at one metre. Before the experiment began, the eye tracker was 
calibrated using a 9 point grid, and then validated using a different grid. This was 
only accepted and the participant allowed to start the experiment when there was an 
average difference of less than 0.5 degrees between the actual eye position and that 
predicted from the calibration and the validation. Stimuli were presented on a 21” 
colour monitor that had a refresh rate of 75 Hz. 
A total of 200 visual analogue scales were used, in order to obtain a confidence 
rating for each decision that a participant made. The scales were presented on paper 
as 12 cm lines (10 per page), and labelled ‘Low Confidence’ on the left end and 
‘High Confidence’ on the right. For each choice, participants were instructed to make 
a pencil mark anywhere along the scale, representing how confident they were in the 
decision they had just made. 
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Stimuli 
The stimuli consisted of RDKs, which were presented centrally within a circular 
aperture that measured five degrees of visual angle. The screen was black, while the 
random dots and targets were white. The motion coherence levels used were 4, 8, 
16, 32 and 64%, and there were forty trials for each motion coherence level. The 
coherent dots, which travelled in one of two directions, had a 100% lifetime whereas 
the other random noise dots were re-plotted in random locations. The random dot 
motion was created by spatially relocating a certain amount of the dots, which gave 
the impression of speed of 6.7 degrees per second along the target axis of 22.5 
degrees on either side of the vertical meridian. The dot density of the display was 
16.7 dots/deg squared/second. The two targets, placed 8 deg from fixation along the 
direction axes of the RDKs, were white annuli created by overlaying a smaller black 
circle (0.5deg in diameter) on a larger white circle (1 deg in diameter). A schematic 
of the task sequence is represented in Figure 1.  
FIGURE 1 HERE 
Procedure 
Participants were first familiarized with the stimuli and the task, and were 
encouraged to carry out as many practice trials as they felt was necessary to 
become comfortable with the task and what they had to do. Participants were 
instructed to move their eyes to one of the targets based on the motion they saw in 
the RDK stimulus, and were told to guess if they were uncertain as to the correct 
answer. When participants were ready to start the trial, they fixated on a small white 
annulus and pressed a button that both initiated the trial and corrected for any small 
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changes in the position of the participant that may be brought about by looking down 
at the paper on which they marked their confidence (using a drift correct procedure 
involving the head camera on the eye tracker and markers attached to the monitor 
integral to the Eyelink II system). A centrally placed fixation cross was then 
presented for 800 – 1200 ms, after which the motion coherence stimulus and the two 
targets appeared. The motion coherence stimulus appeared at a fixed duration of 
125 ms across all trials while the targets were presented for one second. The 
participant then indicated their decision as to the direction of motion they perceived 
in the motion coherence stimulus by making a saccade to one of the two targets. 
After they had done this, they recorded how confident they were in their decision by 
drawing a mark on a visual analogue scale. Participants completed two blocks of 100 
trials, so 200 trials in total. With practice runs, this took about 45 minutes in total. 
 
Data analysis 
The eye tracking software includes a parser that was used to identify the start and 
ends of saccades using a 22 degree per second velocity and 8,000 degrees per 
second squared criteria (SR research Ltd). Further analysis of saccade trajectory 
was accomplished by using software developed in Matlab (Mathworks Inc.) The first 
saccades in each trial were used and from these the saccade latency, saccade 
trajectory and overall direction were calculated. Saccade latency was defined as the 
amount of time between the presentation of the experimental display and the 
initiation of the saccade. A correct landing position was defined as an eye movement 
that landed within a 45 degree window centred on the correct target (see Figure 1 
upper right panel for example saccade traces and details on saccade analysis).  We 
examined the deviation of landing position in terms of how far away from the centre 
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of the target the eyes landed in angular degrees but this was not found to vary with 
increasing motion coherence. This was the case in all three experiments reported 
here. For this reason, and for the sake of brevity, landing position deviations are not 
reported.1  
The maximum trajectory deviation of each saccade relative to the direct path 
between fixation and landing position was determined (see Ludwig and Gilchrist 
2002). This was calculated by fitting a second-order polynomial to the saccade 
trajectory and finding the maximum point of angular deviation from the straight line 
that joined the saccade start position to its end position. 
Saccades were excluded from the analysis as being anticipatory if they were less 
than 100ms, and as not responding to the stimuli if they were over 900ms. This led 
to 27 trials being excluded. 
Confidence ratings were calculated as a measurement in cm, with the low 
confidence end starting at zero, and increasing in number to a maximum of 12cm as 
the responses became nearer the high confidence end. These responses were then 
                                                          
1 In contrast to McSorley & McCloy (2009), we did not find an effect of choice and level of 
evidence on saccade landing position deviation. They showed similar displays to those 
employed here and used the same task but found, similarly to saccade trajectory deviation, 
that landing positions were deviated away from the non-selected target and that this 
deviation increased as the amount of evidence supporting target choice also increased. 
There are several possible reasons why this may have been case, the most likely being that 
the targets are relatively far apart (45 degrees) and saccades are generally only consistently 
affected by competing stimuli within about 30 degrees of the target (Findlay and Brown 
2006; McSorley and Findlay 2003; McSorley et al. 2009; Ottes et al. 1985; Walker et al. 
1997). This is especially so at the relatively longer latencies elicited in these choice tasks. In 
contrast, Saccade trajectories continue to be affected by distracting stimuli at distances of up 
120 deg from the target (McSorley et al. 2009). We would suggest from this that the online 
control of saccade trajectory is much more sensitive to the presence of the other competing 
stimuli than is the final saccade landing position. 
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normalised to take into account each individual participant’s maximum and minimum 
confidence level, and each converted into a percentage of the participant’s maximum 
rating. Normalising the confidence ratings did not alter the results.  
 
Results 
The results from the 4 different performance measures are shown in Figure 2. As 
motion coherence increased so the task became easier: the number of correct 
responses (a) increased (F(4,76)=15.762, p<0.001), while the saccade latency (b) to 
make that choice decreased (F(4,76) = 2.690, p<0.037). As would be expected the 
confidence (c) in motion direction choice increased steadily with increasing motion 
coherence (F(4,76) = 14.171, p<0.001). Figure 2d shows that trajectories of 
saccades tended to deviate away from the non-selected target, and that this 
increased with motion coherence.  While a one way ANOVA found that this was not 
significant (F(4,76)=1.184, p>0.05), a planned trend analysis shows a significant 
linear relationship in the data showing that saccade trajectory deviations away from 
the non-selected target increased in magnitude as motion coherence increased 
(F(1,19)=4.662, p=0.044). The 4% coherence level can be considered as a baseline 
as there is little to no perceived supporting evidence for target choice and this is 
when participants are clearly guessing. Thus saccade trajectory deviation in this 
condition shows the natural saccade curvature elicited in target choice in the 
absence of evidence and can be suggested to purely reflect the inhibition of the non-
selected target. In these terms, the trend analysis above can be interpreted as 
showing the impact on trajectory deviations away from this underlying natural 
 14 
curvature (This is also the case in Experiment 3 which shows the same linear 
relation).  
FIGURE 2 HERE 
Confidence ratings and trajectory deviation away from the non-selected target both 
increase in line with motion coherence and it would be expected that the two 
measures would correlate if they emanated from the same neural signal that 
represents the level of evidence accumulated for the target choice.  To examine this 
a correlation analysis between the two measures was carried out. First, this was 
carried out (separately for each participant) between the confidence ratings and 
trajectory deviations and did not take the level of motion coherence into account. 
This analysis found no significant relationship (average Pearson’s r =-0.0135, 
standard deviation=0.14368, with a range from -0.27 to 0.43). These correlation 
values were also found not to be significantly different from zero (t(19) = 0.810, 
p=0.428). This was broken down in a further set of correlations for each motion 
coherence level and for each participant. The only significant correlation between 
confidence ratings and trajectory deviation was found to be at the 16% level (Motion 
Coherence levels followed by average Pearson’s r: 4% 0.064; 8% 0.161; 16% 0.277, 
p<0.05; 32% -0.048; 64% 0.013, all other p’s>0.05). This analysis suggests that 
while saccade trajectory deviations and confidence reflect the evidence supporting 
the choice they must be ultimately derived from different sources perhaps involving 
different mechanisms or additional processing after the target choice is made.  
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Discussion 
This experiment investigated whether increasing the amount of evidence available to 
base a decision on led to a similar increase in both confidence ratings and trajectory 
deviation away from the non-selected target. It was found that both confidence levels 
and saccade trajectory deviation away from the non-selected target significantly 
increase as motion coherence levels increase. While this could be taken to suggest 
that saccade trajectory deviation and decision confidence are derived from common 
mechanisms, this conclusion is not supported by the correlation analysis between 
confidence ratings and trajectory deviation showing no significant relationship. Thus 
they may be dissociable at some level, which would be consistent with a post-
decisional account of confidence. 
This result seems to run counter to findings from two studies which have found that 
neurons which are involved in the formation of a decision also encode the 
confidence in that decision (Kiani and Shadlen 2009; Kepecs et al. 2008). Kiani and 
Shadlen (2009) used the RDK task and recorded from individual neurons in area LIP 
to investigate whether confidence was encoded in the decision made. The task was 
similar to the one employed in Experiment 1 here. A target was selected with a 
saccade depending on the perceived direction motion inherent in an RDK stimulus, 
which, if correct was rewarded. Kiani and Shadlen also introduced a third ‘opt-out’ 
visual target on half of the trials, which, when selected, led to a smaller reward than 
a correct directional target but was always given. This allowed the non-human 
primate the choice to opt-out of the decision when they were unsure of the answer. 
As with previous single neuron recording studies, it was found that as motion 
coherence increased, the level of firing in the neuron coding for the selected target 
increased rapidly and to a higher level. When the opt-out target was ignored, the 
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choice accuracy was better than on trials where there was no opt-out target option. 
This implies a decision to opt-out is not just based on stimulus difficulty but also on a 
sense of uncertainty. Indeed, neuronal activity in LIP only reached intermediate 
levels when the opt-out clause was selected compared to when a directional target 
was chosen. This suggests that evidence supporting the choice of one target over 
the other was insufficient so the opt-out was exercised, thus the confidence in the 
decision can be said to be reflected in the neuronal activity in LIP.  
 
These findings would suggest that, in an experiment such as ours, if participants 
were given an option to opt-out but did not choose to take it then saccade trajectory 
deviations should be greater than when this opt-out option was not present i.e., there 
should be stronger inhibition of the non-selected target when participants choose to 
ignore the opt-out target option because they should be more certain of their choice 
than when no opt-out option is given. On the other hand, if saccade trajectory 
deviations reflect the evidence supporting the decision, and are not influenced by the 
confidence in that decision, then there should be no difference between the 
magnitude of the deviations whether the opt-out option was present or not. This was 
examined in Experiment 2.   
 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Observers 
20 observers participated in the experiment, all of whom were naïve undergraduates. 
Participants were aged between 18 and 26 years old. All had normal, or corrected to 
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normal eyesight.  Local ethical approval was obtained, and the study was conducted 
in accordance with the standards described in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
Apparatus 
Apparatus used was the same as Experiment 1. 
  
Stimuli 
The stimuli consisted of a random dot kinematogram, as in Experiment 1. The 
motion coherence levels used were 15, 30, 45, 60, 75%, with a planned forty trials 
per motion coherence level. These motion coherence levels changed from 
Experiment 1 as we required a greater range of levels. However, a programming 
error led to there being fifty trials for the 45% level, and thirty trials for the 60% level. 
This is unlikely to have adversely affected the results and there were sufficient trials 
for each motion coherence level. See Experiment 1 for stimuli details. The only 
difference from Experiment 1 was the addition of the opt-out target that was a red 
circle of 0.5 degrees in diameter, placed eight degrees below fixation on the vertical 
axis. This appeared on 50% of the trials.  
 
Procedure 
The procedure is similar to Experiment 1, except that participants were not required 
to rate their confidence after their choice. Rather they were told to saccade to the 
opt-out target if they were uncertain as to the correct answer, instead of one of the 
directional targets. Due to participants not recording their confidence after each trial, 
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the drift correct procedure, carried out every trial in Experiment 1, occurred every 
twenty trials. There were 200 trials in total, which took participants approximately 40 
minutes to complete, with practice and set-up.  
 
Data analysis 
Saccade latency and its trajectory were calculated as in Experiment 1. Responses 
were again categorised as correct if they landed within a 45 degree window centred 
on the correct target. Opt-out target responses were defined as those that travelled 
in a downward direction. Saccades were excluded from the analysis as being 
anticipatory if they were less than 100ms, and as not responding to the stimuli if they 
were over 900ms. This led to 37 saccades being excluded.  
  
Results 
Performance Measures and saccade trajectory deviations 
As motion coherence increased, as with Experiment 1, the overall number of correct 
choices increased (F(4,72)= 57.372, p<0.001; Figure 3a), the amount of opt-out 
choices decreased (F(4,72)=11.822, p <0.001; Figure 3b), and the overall saccade 
latency decreased (F(4,72) = 15.523, p<0.001; Figure 3c). Figure 3a shows that 
performance was generally better when the opt-out target was not present. A two 
way ANOVA was carried out with motion coherence levels and whether the opt-out 
target was present as factors. There was found to be significantly higher levels of 
performance when the opt-out target was not present (F(1,18) = 8.319, p = 0.010) 
and the percentage of correct responses significantly increased as the levels of 
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motion coherence also increased (F(4,72) = 57.535, p<0.001). Differences across 
motion coherence depending upon the presence of the opt-out option proved not to 
be significant (interaction: F(4,72) = 0.964, p = 0.433).  
The same analysis of saccade latency (Figure 3b) showed the same pattern: there 
was a significant increase in saccade latency when the opt-out target was present 
over when it was not present (F(1,18) = 32.059, p< 0.001); an increase in motion 
coherence led to a significant decrease in saccade latency; (F(4,72) = 18.463, 
p<0.001, with a significant linear contrast; (F(1,18) = 32.059, p<0.001); and no 
significant (although trending) interaction (F(4,72) = 2.237, p=.061).   
It is important to note that while there are not many trials on which participants 
elected to opt-out of the choice this was sufficient to produce a behavioural impact. 
All participants (except 1) chose to opt-out of making a decision at least once, with 
50% of them electing the opt-out target over 10 times. Overall the opt-out target was 
selected 216 times and its presence can be seen to be having a behavioural impact 
on choice performance and the latency of response. Performance was found to differ 
when an opt-out target was present compared with when it was not present (See 
Figure 3a). Further analysis of saccade latency showed longer latency responses on 
trials in which the opt-out target was presented and was selected compared with 
when it was present but not selected, i.e., when a target was selected it was done so 
more quickly then when one was not selected [opt-out selected average was 639 ms 
(s.d. 147 ms) while target selected with opt-out present was 459 ms  (s.d. 54 ms); 
t(18)=-5.13, p<0.001)]. 
FIGURE 3 HERE 
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In contrast saccade trajectory (Figure 3d) was not found to significantly vary due to 
the presence of the opt-out target (F(1,18)= 2.459, p=0.134) but there was a 
significant main effect of motion coherence (F(4,72) = 7.742, p<0.001). There was no 
significant interaction between the two variables (F(4,72) = 1.350, p = 0.260). Thus 
saccade trajectory deviates away from the non-selected target more as motion 
coherence levels increase but does not differ depending upon the certainty and 
confidence in the choice. 
 
Discussion 
Participants’ performance improved as the motion coherence levels became higher, 
and saccade latency decreased correspondingly. As motion coherence increased, 
the saccade path deviated further away from the non-selected target. This replicates 
the results found by McSorley and McCloy (2009) and Experiment 1, and supports 
earlier conclusions that the increase in evidence leads to an increase in inhibition of 
the non-selected target, which is shown by a rise in the amount of deviation away 
from the non-selected target.  
Opt-out target choices were also affected by the level of motion coherence; 
participants made fewer saccades to the opt-out target when there were higher 
levels of evidence in the RDK. This is analogous to the findings from the previous 
experiment, which found that confidence increased as a function of motion 
coherence.  However, saccade trajectory deviations were not significantly different 
from each other when an opt-out target was present but ignored, compared with 
those elicited when there was no opt-out target. This suggests that whether or not 
the opt-out target was present had no effect on the level of inhibition of the non-
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selected target. This again suggests that saccade control and confidence are not 
based on the same neural activity at the time of the decision.  
It was noted that there were not many trials on which participants elected to opt-out of the 
choice however this was sufficient to produce a behavioural impact. It can be argued that as 
there was no consequence (either a reward or punishment) for target choice there was little 
incentive for participants to elect to opt-out of the choice. While we did find that the opt-out 
target indicated those trials on which confidence was lower, a stronger opt-out target that 
introduces consequences for target choice (i.e., one that included a monetary reward) may 
also increase the rate of opting out. It may be that the current opt-out target underestimates 
the rate of low confidence trials or only captures the extremely low confidence trials. 
Furthermore, this formulation of the opt-out target would be more in keeping with Kiani and 
Shadlen (2009) in which the opt-out target was associated with liquid reward. 
In the next experiment, we examine whether an induced feeling of confidence, i.e., 
over confidence or under confidence, in performance directly affects saccade 
control. If it is the case that confidence judgement and saccade control are derived 
from the same underlying activity then it may be the case that different levels of pre-
existing confidence may change this underlying activity, possibly through top down 
biases and feedback loops, and influence saccade control. One reason to suspect 
that this might be the case is that being more certain of the location of a saccade 
target, which could be interpreted as has having greater confidence, has been 
shown to increase saccade latency and shift saccade trajectory deviation away from 
distractors (Dorris and Munoz 1998; Kim and Basso 2008; Walker et al. 2006). Thus 
being more confident in target choice may reduce saccade latencies and increase 
trajectory deviations away from the non-selected target by increasing the extent of 
inhibition of the target or the speed by which that inhibition develops. In order to 
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examine the impact of confidence on saccade deviation in target choice, we provided 
manipulated feedback to two groups of participants regarding their performance on 
the same RDK task as in Experiment 1. This instilled differing levels of confidence 
between the two groups independent of the external evidence. In a subsequent block 
of trials, with unmodified feedback appropriate to their choices, we examined 
whether the differences in confidence felt by the two groups impacted on the same 
underlying activity from which saccade trajectory control is derived or whether 
saccade trajectory reflected the evidence supporting target selection to the same 
extent regardless of confidence. Indeed we find that despite differences in 
confidence, saccade trajectory deviations were found to be similarly affected by 
increasing evidence supporting the decision suggesting that confidence is based on 
post-decisional processing, unlike the saccade trajectory that is based on neural 
activity at the time of the decision. 
 
Experiment 3 
Method 
Observers 
40 observers participated in the experiment, all of whom were naïve undergraduates.  
Participants were aged between 18 and 25 years old. All had normal, or corrected to 
normal eyesight.  Local ethical approval was obtained, and the study was conducted 
in accordance with the standards described in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki. 
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Apparatus 
See Experiment 1 for details. 
 
Stimuli 
The motion coherence levels used were 4, 8, 16 and 32%, with forty trials per motion 
coherence level (twenty in each block), with 160 trials in total. These levels are the 
same as those employed in Experiment 1.The highest level (64%) was removed as 
this may have led to participants becoming more aware of the manipulated feedback.  
 
Design and Procedure 
The design and procedure was the same as Experiment 1 except that feedback was 
given in the form of the word ‘incorrect’ or ‘correct’ appearing in the centre of the 
screen. There were two blocks of 80 trials; in the first block participants were given 
manipulated feedback, having been assigned into one of two conditions. Half of the 
participants were assigned to the high feedback condition that meant that these 
participants were told they had made the correct decision, regardless of the 
response they had actually made, 70% of the time. The remaining participants were 
assigned to the low condition in which they were told that they had made the 
incorrect decision 70% of the time. In the second block of 80 trials, feedback 
reflected the participant’s choice and whether it was correct or not. After being 
presented with feedback, participants recorded how confident they were in their 
decision by drawing a mark on a visual analogue scale. It was stressed to the 
participants that the confidence measurement should reflect how confident they had 
felt in their decision, even if the feedback had subsequently told them they were 
wrong. Also, if they felt that they genuinely had no idea about the direction of motion 
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that they should guess, and that it was acceptable to put a mark on the ‘Low 
confidence’ end of the scale. Participants were required to use the button press to 
start each trial to drift correct for any movement that occurred when they were 
recording their confidence. This ensured that they were fixating within one degree 
visual angle of the fixation cross when the trial started. There were 160 trials in total, 
which took participants about forty minutes to complete, including practice and set-
up time.  
 
Data analysis 
See Experiment 1 for details. The same exclusion criteria applied as in Experiment 
1, which led to 337 trials (5.3% of the total number of all trials across all participants) 
being excluded. 
 
 
Results 
Feedback manipulation 
The primary aim of manipulating feedback was to modify participants’ confidence in 
their decision independent of the external evidence that supports it. Figure 4 (upper 
row) shows the normalized confidence ratings (to take into account individual’s 
minimum and maximum score) for both the modified feedback and the unmodified 
feedback blocks as a function of motion coherence and its development across the 
experimental block (Figure 4 lower row).  
FIGURE 4 HERE 
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The feedback manipulation showed a similar effect on confidence across motion 
coherence levels in both blocks (Figure 4 Upper row). Two separate two-way 
ANOVAs for each block with feedback and motion coherence as factors showed that 
motion coherence level did not have a significant impact on confidence ratings in the 
modified; (F(3,114)= 0.669, p=0.573) or the unmodified blocks ( F(3,114)= 2.025, 
p=0.114). There was no interaction between the block and the motion coherence 
level in the modified; (F(3,114)=1.343, p=0.264), or unmodified block; 
F(3,114)=0.930, p=0.429).There was only a main effect of feedback for both the 
modified; (F(1,38)= 22.503, p<0.001), and unmodified blocks; (F(1,38) = 5.474, 
p=0.025) with the confidence score for those in the high condition being significantly 
higher than in the low.  
Figure 4 (lower row) shows standardised confidence ratings as a function of trial 
number (quartile). When the data is examined across the first, modified block 
participants given more positive feedback about their performance (high condition) 
became increasingly more confident whereas those given more negative feedback 
(low condition) became less confident. A two way ANOVA with feedback (high vs 
low) and quartile as factors supported this interpretation showing, in the modified 
block, a main effect of feedback (F(1,38)=15.328, p<0.001), no effect of quartile 
(F(3,114)=0.255, p=0.858) but with an interaction between feedback and quartile 
(F(3,114) = 3.092, p= 0.030).  
In the unmodified block, confidence did not vary as the block progressed, with those 
in the high group having higher ratings of confidence throughout. A two way ANOVA 
on the unmodified feedback block showed only a main effect of feedback 
(F(1,38)=5.340, p=0.026). The effect of this manipulation was found to continue 
throughout the unmodified feedback block showing no change as the block 
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progressed (F(3,114)=0.689, p=0.560). There was no significant interaction between 
the quartile and the block; (F(3,114)=0.746, p=0.527). This analysis shows that the 
confidence manipulation was successful in instilling different levels of confidence in 
the two groups of participants.  
This analysis shows that the feedback manipulation has a dramatic effect of 
confidence: positive feedback regardless of the level of evidence supporting the 
decision increases confidence in that decision while negative feedback decreases 
confidence. This develops over time and is felt across all levels of external evidence. 
Participants can be safely grouped into those having high confidence and those 
having low confidence. We now examine the impact of these different internal 
confidence levels on the performance and saccade control in the unmodified block.   
 
Effect of feedback manipulation on saccade control 
FIGURE 5 HERE 
In order to examine the effect feedback manipulation in the modified block had upon 
the performance and saccade responses in the unmodified block the data from the 
unmodified block alone is reported. Figure 5 shows that (a) participants’ performance 
improved as motion coherence increased but (b) saccade latency showed no 
change. A two-way mixed-factor ANOVA, comparing the two unmodified blocks in 
which correct feedback was given (high vs low), confirmed that performance showed 
a significant increase (Motion Coherence; F(3,114)=11.180, p<0.001, with a 
significant linear trend F(1,38)=13.548, p=0.001) This is largely driven by an 
improvement in performance in the 32% motion coherence condition. No interactions 
(F(3,114)=0.338, p=0.798) were found, but there was a trend for better performance 
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for those in the low condition in the unmodified block compared to the high condition 
F(1,38)=3.504, p=0.069). Saccade latency, on the other hand, showed no difference 
either as a function of feedback manipulation (F(1,38)=0.003, p=0.953) or motion 
coherence (F(3,114)-1.001, p=0.395)2. 
 
Saccade trajectories (Figure 5c) tended to deviate further from the non-selected 
target as levels of motion coherence became higher (F(3,114)=4.304, p=0.006; with 
a significant linear trend F(1,38)=6.411, p=0.016). However, there were no effects of 
feedback condition (F(1,38)=0.168, p=0.684) and no significant interaction 
(F(3,114)=1.437, p=0.236). 
 
Discussion 
Previous experiments in this series have suggested a dissociation between the way 
that evidence accumulated to form a perceptual target choice is used in saccade 
control and to derive confidence: with saccade metrics reflecting the evidence 
available to form a target choice and confidence being related to this but subject to 
additional post-decisional processing. Experiment 3 directly examined whether 
confidence can be dissociated from the evidence supporting target choice and 
                                                          
2 Unlike in Experiment 1, and McSorley and McCloy (2009), latency was not found to decrease as 
motion coherence increased. We suggest this to be as a result of the confidence manipulation, and 
possibly due to the fact that both of these previous experiments included a higher motion coherence 
level (64%) that was not present in this experiment. Removing this level, which gives the most 
evidence for one of the options, thereby making the decision easier, may have made the usual 
decrease in saccade latency less evident.  
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whether pre-existing confidence can bias the underlying neural activity that 
represents the evidence used to select a target and thereby influence saccade 
control. Participants received manipulated feedback regarding their ability to perform 
the RDK task, designed to instil a sense of high or low confidence. Those in the high 
confidence condition were found to have significantly higher confidence ratings than 
those in the low confidence condition; both in the block when they received 
manipulated feedback and the second block where accurate task performance 
feedback was given. Participants’ eye movement metrics were then compared in 
order to ascertain whether this difference in confidence impacted on target choice, 
i.e., was the non-selected target inhibited more strongly for those with high 
confidence compared with those with low confidence despite the evidence for the 
target being the same. It was found that, despite clear differences in confidence, 
saccade trajectory deviations did not differ showing that confidence is dissociable 
from, and does not bias the evidence used in the saccade target choice. This 
suggests that confidence is a function of additional processing over and above the 
evidence used to make the decision and that confidence in a decision does not 
feedback on or bias, in some kind of top-down fashion, the underlying activity that 
represents the evidence used to make these kinds of saccade choices.  
 
General Discussion 
This series of experiments aimed to investigate whether confidence ratings and eye 
movement responses are linked to the external evidence supporting a decision (i.e., 
the level of motion coherence within an RDK). Three strands of evidence motivated 
this. First, a series of single neuron recording experiments have found that higher 
levels of motion coherence lead to increased neural firing in the LIP (Kiani and 
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Shadlen 2009; Roitman and Shadlen 2002; Shadlen and Newsome 2001; Shadlen 
and Newsome 1996), frontal eye fields (Kim and Shadlen 1999), and the superior 
colliculus (Horwitz and Newsome 1999). Second, McSorley and McCloy (2009) 
showed that the evidence supporting target choice is also reflected in deviations of 
saccade metrics: The saccade deviates away from the non-selected target reflecting 
the inhibition of that choice. The extent of this deviation increases as there is more 
evidence for the target choice, reflecting greater inhibition of the non-selected target. 
Third, it has been reported that the evidence underlying the formation of target 
choice and confidence in that choice can be derived from this same neural activity 
(Kiani and Shadlen 2009). In this paper we aimed to establish whether the level of 
confidence in a decision, and the metrics of the saccade indicating the decision 
similarly reflect the evidence presented within an RDK, and by extension, the level of 
neural firing representing the evidence accumulated for that decision. Experiment 1 
showed that while confidence and inhibition of the non-selected target increased as 
evidence supporting the choice increased they did not correlate with each other, 
suggesting that they do not have a common locus. Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 
showed that greater confidence in target choice, shown by not electing to take an 
opt-out option in Experiment 2 and by directly manipulating confidence in Experiment 
3, did not lead to differences in the inhibition of the non-selected target. Overall, we 
have found that while confidence and saccade trajectory deviation are related to the 
formation of target choice they do not seem related to each other. We suggest that 
saccade control and confidence reflect the evidence for the target choice but 
confidence may also be subject to further post-decisional processing after target 
choice formation. It is important to note that what have reported here is not as simple 
as a null result. Each measure (saccade deviation and confidence rating) clearly 
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does change as function of the MC, i.e. the underlying evidence used to support the 
choice of motion direction impacts on confidence ratings and saccade deviation. The 
results simply suggest that they do so independently. 
 
Models of confidence judgements are often classified on basis of whether or not the 
feeling of confidence is derived directly from the evidence that supports the decision. 
Decisional locus models state that confidence in the decision can be read out directly 
from the accumulated evidence at the time the decision was made (as per Kiani and 
Shadlen 2009; Kepecs et al. 2008), whereas post-decisional locus models state that 
confidence is based on information that arrives after the decision (such as Pleskac 
and Busemeyer, 2010). Our results are consistent with such post-decisional 
accounts.  
There are a number of different scenarios in which post-decisional processes may 
account for our results. One possibility is that confidence ratings are derived from 
further processing than that which is available to the target choice itself. This may 
involve the same information as that used to make the decision, but which may be 
accruing internal noise or simply decaying thereby changing its quality in both cases. 
On the other hand there may be differences in information that is available to choice 
and confidence. One may have access to information not available to the other. This 
may take the form of a dual-channel model in which one channel supports conscious 
processing while the other unconscious processing (Del Cul et al. 2009; Morewedge 
and Kahneman 2010) or other more complex asymmetries in information access 
(e.g. Pasquali et al. 2010). In the context of our experiments, confidence may be 
based on conscious processing and the target choice may be based on unconscious 
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processing. A further possibility is that confidence and target choice are based on 
evidence that has been differently transformed giving different representations. 
In summary, this series of experiments replicate the effects shown by McSorley and 
McCloy (2009); as motion coherence increased, saccade latency decreased, and 
correct performance and trajectory deviation away from the non-selected target 
increased. This innovative way of looking at eye movement metrics was extended in 
this paper to investigate confidence in a perceptual decision. We were specifically 
interested in whether it was based on the same neural firing, caused by the evidence 
within the RDK, as the saccade metrics or on further processing. Our results suggest 
that confidence ratings are based on further processing after the decision has been 
made.  
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Figure Legends 
 
Fig. 1 Saccade decision task. After a random fore period of 800-1200 ms, the targets 
appeared, followed in quick succession by the RDK stimulus. The RDK was present 
for 125ms, and the targets remained for a further 875 ms. The direction of the RDK 
stimulus here is represented by arrows (not present in the display). For clarity fewer 
dots are shown here than were actually drawn on any one video frame. The upper 
right panel of the figure shows a breakdown of saccade analysis. Each saccade was 
deemed correct if it fell within 45 deg of the target of dot motion (shown here as 
dashed lines bracketing each target). A number of eye movement responses from 
one participant are shown for the left target. For the right a schematic eye trace is 
shown. On this  shows the trajectory deviation from a direct, straight, saccade and 
 shows the landing position deviation from the centre of the target.   
 
Fig. 2 Performance measures. The percentage of correct responses (a) rose as 
motion coherence of the RDK increased, while saccade latency (b) decreased. Both 
the feeling of confidence in the choice (c) and saccade trajectory deviation away 
from non-selected target (d) were also found to increase with motion coherence. 
Error bars are repeated measures error bars (Masson and Loftus 2003) 
 
Fig. 3 Percentage of correct responses (a) increased when the opt-out target was 
present (diamonds) and when it was not (triangles). This was found to be stronger 
when the opt-out target was present. (b) Percentage of opt-out target choice 
decreased as motion coherence increased. (c) Saccade latencies were found to 
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decrease across the motion coherence levels. (d) Saccade trajectory deviations 
were not different when the opt-out target was (diamonds) and was not (triangles) 
present but overall deviations were away from the non-selected target and that this 
increased with increasing motion coherence. Error bars are repeated measures error 
bars (Masson & Loftus, 2003) 
 
Fig. 4 Upper row: Normalised confidence ratings for both the modified feedback and 
the unmodified feedback blocks across motion coherence levels.  Diamonds show 
results from the high performance feedback manipulations and triangles the low 
performance feedback condition. Lower row: Normalized confidence ratings for both 
the modified feedback and the unmodified feedback blocks as a function of trial 
number (quartile). Blocks have been quartiled running from the first 25% of trials to 
the last 25%. Error bars show the between subjects standard error of mean 
 
Fig. 5 The number of correct responses (a) saccade latency (b) and saccade 
trajectory deviations (c) as a function of motion coherence for the high and low 
confidence conditions. Error bars show the between subjects standard error of mean 
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FIGURE 1 
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FIGURE 2 
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FIGURE 3 
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FIGURE 4 
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FIGURE 5 
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